These two central strategies are moderately and intelligently presented. Much of their content, too, is indisputable: prices turned harshly against farmers [World Bank 1982a] and increasingly massive reliance upon food imports [OAU 1981 ] are incompatible with sustained agricultural progress. Yet, although the OAU and Bank expository documents are filled with gestures of mutual respect and even agreement, they sound a little like a somewhat tired, and not very Afrocentric, re-run of the Latin American development debates of 1957-64. These debates set publiclysponsored, import-substituting development in a planned economy against privately-managed, exportpromoting development in an open economy.' The needs of agriculturists, especially of smallholders in Africa, easily go unheard beneath the clash; for it is grand, ideological, and essentially industry-orientated. The French radicals of 1968 proclaimed 'Ni Marx ni Jésus'; does broadly-based and efficient agricultural growth in Africa require 'Ni Berg ni Lagos'?
The two opposing views were both well argued by Raoul Prebisch in, respectively [1959] and [1964] . Be//cue, 1983, vol 14 no 3, lnstutnte of Development Studtes, Sussex Two other strategies, now in the course of being formulated, may hold out more prospects for meeting the specific needs of African farmers. The first strategy is implicit in the Charter of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). The Charter directs IFAD to use its funds mainly to meet the food requirements of the poorest people in the poorest developing countries. IFAD, therefore, is almost bound to spotlight the great mass of African subsistence producers. In contrast to Asia, it is these and not 'landless labourers' (rural or urban) who form the great bulk of Africa's potentially hungry poor.
They are mostly too small to be reached by the World Bank's 'smallholder' strategy, with its emphasis (initially at least) on producers and areas that seem more promising and progressive in the existing state of techno-economic knowledge. Also, most subsistence mini-farmers are insufficiently integrated into the urban economy to provide surpluses for it, and therefore do not appeal to the industrialising strategists of Lagos. IFAD could provide important guidelines, and funds, for development aimed at this large, poor group.
The other new approach stems from the increasing disillusionment of the Nordic and EEC aid donors with piecemeal rural activity in Africa. This disillusionment covers not only project aid (especially if it is 'integrated' across activities involving several weakly-coordinated ministries), but also food aid, which is increasingly seen as encouraging recipient governments to delay attention to agriculture. As an alternative, Nordic and EEC donors are seeking particular ways to help African countries to develop, not specific projects or aid requests, but a) total strategies for allocating resources, by private incentives and/or public action, towards rural activity; and b) policy, planning and implementation machinery (and human capacity) to make, change, and carry out such strategies for themselves in future. The Swedish aid agency, SIDA, has undertaken a series of 'rural-sector strategy missions' in East African countries. And the new head of EEC's Directorate General for Development (DG 8) , Commissioner Edgard Pisani, having expressed deep doubts about existing EEC food and project aid, is seeking to reconstruct the substantial (and largely African) EDF programme increasingly around a series of 'food strategies', to eliminate undernutrition and fooddependency in a defined time-horizon [COM (82) 640]. Such strategies are, of course, to be developed by the countries themselves, with technical assistance only if they want it. The first four 'strategies' are being proposed by Kenya, Mali, Zambia and Rwanda.
All this is reminiscent of the World Bank's shift from project overview to 'policy dialogues', a shift designed to improve the Bank's impact on national development patterns. Like that shift, the 'rural strategy' approach is partly a recognition that normally a single aid project has far less effect on total (or rural) development than, say, policy on prices or personnel. Indeed, aid in support of any particular project may merely displace government support for the same project, so that the aid is effectively supporting the marginal, least-important government activity: what Hans Singer calls the 'fungibility problem'. Partly, too, the move towards national strategy-building and policy dialogue is a response to donors' resource scarcity; advice is cheaper than aid projects.2 More positively, however, a real case exists for this new emphasis. Rural and other development strategies, as attempted by developing countries or as advocated by funding agencies, are too prone to changing fashions. Both the EEC and its African associates need a series of medium-term, country-specific plans to achieve defined goals.3 In that context, the Pisani concept of country-by-country 'food strategies' may well be more tangible and specific than SIDA's search for comprehensive 'rural development strategies'. The goal of removing undernutrition in a specified timeframe is attractive, definable, and ofteh attainable. This article seeks to clarify some of the issues and requirements facing any EEC programme to assist African countries in developing 'food strategies'.
Five main issues are considered, each very briefly. First, any strategies to end undernutrition in Africa need to examine its scale, nature and causes (next section). Second, to design any such strategy, based either on food-based agriculture or on trade, African and EEC planners could benefit from, and indeed may require, some tolerably reliable data (third section). Third, a national strategy for food-based agriculture has to select a 'mix' between approaches based on generalised price-incentives, on inputs of current and capital resources, on efforts to change the agricultural output-mix, ön the rural 'surround', and on research, development and spread of new technologies (fourth section). Fourth, there are linked choices to be made 2 But is advice less likely to be accepted as accompanying project aid becomes scarcer?
This does not imply directive or comprehensive planning;
indicative planning, with price incentives, is an alternative way to achieve such goals.
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between big and small units of activity, and between labour-intensity and capital-intensity (fifth section Third, economic behaviour suggests that perceived priority for extra calories is found only among the poorest 10-15 per cent of persons in low-income countries. When income rises slightly, only these people maintain all three of the following: a) the share, normally 75-85 per cent, of outlay devoted to food; b) the share of food outlay going to carbohydrate sources; and c) the share of such sources coming from cheap cereals and root crops. The 'poor but not ultrapoor', when income rises, diversify their spending into pleasanter, more varied foods, and into better clothing, shelter, etc.
The operational conclusion to be drawn from these findings is important. The poorest 10-15 per cent comprise a manageable target for a policy to end undernutrition in Africa in the 1980s, whereas the poorest 45-50 per cent do not. That is the bright side. The dark side is that even agencies such as the World 'Even less explicably, the EEC also lacks the data to assess its contribution to a trade-based (as opposed to a food-productionbased) strategy to reduce undernutrition. For example, the EEC's changing share in the trade of individual or grouped developing countries (ACP or other) is invariably presented in value terms. This begs the crucial policy questions: was the change due to changes in relative volumes of EEC and 'rest-of-the-world' trade with the relevant partner(s) -or to changes in relative prices? In either case, was it supply, demand, or both that moved differently for EEC and for other trading partners of the Third World? 24 Which Approach to Take Let us assume that the development of a 'food strategy' is directed mainly at the dangerously undernourished 10-15 per cent of persons, and that it is supported by a rapidly improving base of production data. What are the main thrusts of such a strategy likely to be? Of course the answers will differ according to the prospects of each country -and its problems. In one or two African countries, priceincentives are so húrrendously distorted that little can be done until they are adjusted. In almost all, much more than in Asia or Latin America, the role of agriculture as a milch cow (to support a dubiously productive urban elite, in both public and private sectors) produces price distortions that harm efficiency and equity alike.'2 Nevertheless, there are grounds to question the concentration on priceincentives of some proposed strategies for African agricultural development, although not, as yet, the EEC's. Better incentives (if we can define them, which may need much better production data) can't be bad; African farmers are just as responsive to price stimuli as other farmers.'3 However, major diversion of scarce strategy-building energies into efforts to improve price policy, especially if they can be portrayed or caricatured as foreign interference, is probably seldom the best use of those energies in African agriculture, for three reasons.
First, the response of total farm output to priceincentives, while positive, is far smaller than for any particular crop, because land or labour input must be increased and not merely switched between uses. Second, with technology so undeveloped, even substantial price-responsiveness, raising some farmers' outputs by 20 or 30 per cent, would add little to production: 20 per cent of very little is very little. Third, while price-incentives to increase output are sensible for each country taken separately, they could disastrously glut markets of some (mainly export) crops for all African countries taken together.
Generally more important than price policies are measures to make readily available timely inputs (seed, fertiliser), good administrative and technical personnel, and, increasingly, appropriate capital such as small-scale irrigation or drainage. Even where amply staffed, African ministries of agriculture are frequently over-centralised, and hampered by lack of vehicles, petrol, and appropriate incentives to officials from reaching the field. A few unsuccessful, wellpublicised, large-scale and administratively complex 2 ratio of non-farm to farm output (and income) per person in early modern development in nine now-developed countries was around I '/2-2'/2: 1. In the 1960s, in Asia and Latin America it was 3-3'/:l -butin Africa, typically, it is at least 5:1 [Lipton 1977: 435-7] .
was already clear from Dean [1966] , esp. ch. 4. However, the most important component of any food strategy, in almost all African countries, will be the development and delivery of technically valid, economically field-tested recommendations and/or new inputs -applied research and its extension. A few outstanding research stations (mostly international) and a few thousand 'modern' farmers (mostly profitable only because of successful angling for highly selective subsidy amid a generally mulcted agriculture) have concealed from many observers the appalling void that fills the huge African spaces where applicable knowledge and scientific smallholding should be. Major crops such as maize, millet and sorghum are broadcast randomly, seldom weeded, denied water management, and hardly ever manured on African smallholdings; as a result they commonly yield at below half the levels prevailing in similar circumstances in Asia.'4 Neither African farmers nor the much-maligned extension workers are to blame. 4That is, with similar (and similarly risky) environments, and roughly similar relative prices of inputs and outputs.
Little that is useful comes out of the extension pipeline, but this is largely the result of the technocratic nature of most research. Thus, farmers are regularly advised to change planting dates or to apply large amounts of, often remote, kraal manure.
To follow such advice has, at best, been proved technically successful at the research station; seldom is it profitable; and hardly ever has it been tested, for profitability and reliability, under smallholders' actual field conditions. Often in disillusionment and doubt, extension workers pass on such advice; farmers accept, or more often reject, it at their peril. The fault lies with frequently irrelevant, sometimes self-serving research.
Fortunately the major advances of smallholderresponsive techno-economic research in Asia and in much of Africa, the cost to government of discouraging farm output by food price policies or public resource allocations that appease urban interests, seems relatively small. But if, for example, the grain yields, foregone through inadequate incentives or fertiliser delivery systems, have been raised by researçh to 2-3 tons per acre, attainable profitably by smallholders at acceptably low risk, the costs of neglect are clear to government. Without a research push -and a smallholder, food-linked, fieldtest-oriented research strategy -good intentions with regard to prices and allocations for African agriculture are likely to be frustrated.
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Similar principles, of centring easily rural development around technologies that make sense for poor people who own little but their labour-power, apply to the artisan 'surround' of agriculture. Economists who get to know African villages after experience in Asia or Latin America are astounded by the apparent relative absence of sophisticated but labour-intensive technology -not only in agriculture (row planting, waterwheels, rotary weeding) but also in artisanship. The two absences, indeed, are linked. Without a plane, a vice, a saw, a workbench, and a few taught principles, a carpenter can scarcely produce a seed-drill, an appropriate plough, a water-wheel. A blacksmith without a bellows is analogously handicapped, whatever his skill in adapting parts from abandoned cars. Moreover, an unproductive rural 'surround' cannot afford to demand much food from local farmers, just as it cannot supply them with much of the wherewithal to grow or process it.
Labour or Capital
To base a food strategy on rapid adaptive research into such 'poor people's technology' is, in a sense, to 9 ' ¡ Mini-thresher, Niger.' will this raise output or just displace workers? learn from Asia. However, it might be objected that in Asia even such innovations as high-yielding cereals have probably benefited the rural rich more than the rural poor, even though they supply cheap calories, are labour-intensive, and tend to reduce risk.'5 By most Asian standards, however, Africa's greater ruralurban inequality and intra-rural equality increase both the urgency of the proposed research strategy and its prospects of an equitable outcome.
A deeper objection is that most of Africa, unlike most of South and East Asia, appears to have no land shortage. Hence labour-intensive strategies of smallfarm crop production are not so obviously indicated. Why not a strategy of big farms, capital-intensity in crop production, and extensive animal grazing? Merely to intone 'small is beautiful', or to treat employment (i.e. drudgery) as an end in itself, is not to dispose of this alternative strategy, which has lasting 'The poor have not lost absolutely; would have bren far worse off without the extra food grown due to H YVs; and must have gained from the technology's impact in raising labour/land ratlos and in providing 'inferior goods'. But the rich gained proportionately more [Lipton 1979a [Lipton , 1978 .
appeal for many African politicians and bureaucr Big farms seem 'modern' and scientific; small far seem random and messy.
However, the appearance is illusory since it is crea by subsidies (on credit, fuels, etc) enjoyed only by farms, and by ignorance of the complex economic small farms. and for costs and benefits outside the project's immediate range of application), and social (i.e.
allowing, in a stated way, for the distribution of gains and losses from the project).
As regards approval, the EDF gains because it has simple procedures for small and emergency projects, and separate funds to pay for them. But it loses, at least in theory, because the techno-economic judgements of the aid agency (effectively DG 8) are not the last word in approving or rejecting a project. Projects also have to be referred to an international committee, the 'EDF Committee', on which all 10 EEC members are represented. The precise distribution of responsibility between DG 8 and the EDF committee is a shadowy area, and DG 8 is jealous of its formal power. Nevertheless, the need to get the approval of 10 nationalistic, heterogeneous donors must cast a long shadow. The facts remain that Africa's increasing net food imports are its central development constraint; that growing hunger is its central poverty problem; and that EEC is well placed to help, and in the medium term to gain by so doing. However, the project cycle, and the underlying problem of country programming, will need attention, if this potential is to be realised.
If the EEC is to use its relationship with ACP to help individual African countries to implement their food strategies, then the EDF's project cycle will need to be coordinated, at a level permitting unified support of a recipient nation's food strategy, with EEC's own food aid, and possibly (though this presents a major problem) with bilateral aid from major EEC donors.
Finally, EEC's aid policies need to be made more consistent with its trade policies, as these affect developing nations' capacity to provide adequate calories for all their people, and to avoid unsustainable levels of food imports. A final question concerns the linkage of EEC trade and production policies to its support of African food strategies. Even more than food aid, such policies are at present firmly outside DG 8's sphere of influence. Yet in at least two areas, sugar and vegetable oils, the side-effects of the CAP damage the incomes of poor farmers in developing countries and therefore their capacity to buy food (or to pay for investments in its production). African and other Associates do not escape the impact (over a third of Associates' sugar exports are currently sold at world prices, depressed by the EEC's de facto dumping). Special arrangements for African beef exports, while generous and welcome in isolation, can shift farm resources away from small farmers growing cheap (i.e. usually cereal or root) calories for local consumption. On the borderline between aid and trade is Stabex; the significance of its benefits has been questioned in an excellent recent analysis [Hewitt 1983 ], but its net effect has to be to shift ACP governments, and indirectly farmers, away from food production for home use, and towards commodities sold to EEC with some degree of apparent stability of earnings.
The EEC's food strategy, especially in combination with parallel approaches in other aid agencies (such as Sweden's, and IFAD), could be a major advance in developing a coherent, locally-specific set of strategies to tackle the central problem of poverty in Africa. This article has argued that, to succeed, such an approach will require a) concentration upon groups at major nutritional risk -groups that are smaller but also rather harder to reach than is usually claimed; b) a systematic prior effort to generate regular national procedures to gather reliable farm output, and to some extent input, data; c) an approach to developing agriculture and the rural surround that is based on techno-economic research and its delivery embodied in field-tested, attractive inputs -not on 'pushing a piece of string' by seeking to develop agriculture via incentives or institutions based on the present technoeconomic darkness; d) some 'learning from Asia' in respect of technology and farm-size policies; and e) the resolution of critical questions about the procedures and powers of EEC itself, in respect both of the project cycle and of the political context of Third World policies These problems are raised in this article, not to denigrate the 'food strategy' approach, but -by outlining some major problems in making it into a reality -to improve, however slightly, its chances of success.
A version of this article is being simultaneously published in the ODI Development Policy Review.
